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Steering Elephants: Focusing the Interagency to Enable Planning for SSTR Operations

by

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A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

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23 April, 2008

Abstract

Recent Presidential and Defense policies direct coordination of stabilization efforts across the government and define Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction as a core military mission giving it equal priority as combat operations. Increasing post-conflict challenges require that we have adaptive planning processes across the government agile enough to employ all the instruments of national power at decisive points when required. However, pre-coordinated and deliberate planning to achieve unified action and enhance unity of effort during security and stability operations remains illusive at the operational level. This paper argues that a critical gap in planning capability for security and stability operations exists at the operational level. It suggests a new functional interagency structure would best enable planning by aligning corresponding functional capability with requirements through increased authority, unified action, service support, and analysis. The new functional structure, modeled after U.S. Special Operations Command, proposes integrating the interagency to enable civil-military cooperation and planning, best serving to accomplish post-conflict objectives.

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Introduction

Since the World War there has been a flood of literature dealing with the old principles illustrated and the new technique developed in that war; but there always have been and ever will be other wars of an altogether different kind, undertaken in very different theaters of operations and requiring entirely different methods from those of the World War.

—Small Wars Manual, USMC 1940¹

To meet the increasing security challenges of the 21st Century, regional combatant commanders should refocus planning capabilities to exploit all the instruments of national power in order to achieve security and stability objectives world-wide. To date, unity of effort during Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) operations has largely been achieved through cooperation. However, pre-coordinated and deliberate unified action remains illusive at the operational level. In reference to the war in Iraq, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates recently stated, “A lot of Defense Department folks wonder where the rest of the government is in this war. There is clearly a need for greater interagency collaboration.”² However, a review of the literature suggests no meaningful progress has been made to institutionalize and move interagency collaboration and deliberate planning forward, undermining unity of effort and accomplishment of objectives. This paper argues that a critical gap in military and interagency planning capability for security and stability operations³ exists at the operational level: to fill this gap functional joint-interagency sub-unified commands under each combatant commander, and a supporting interagency functional command could better achieve post-combat objectives.

This paper begins by providing background for security and stability operations outlining current United States policy and corresponding capabilities which have developed from these policies. Next, analysis is provided focused on security and stability operations in Iraq to demonstrate continued lack of deliberate SSTR planning at the operational level resulting in

degraded capability. The paper continues by suggesting why a new functional structure may be important to the combatant commanders. Finally, a recommended solution to better plan and execute security and stability operations is provided, that aligns corresponding functional capability with requirements at the operational level. The new structure, modeled after U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM), proposes integrating the interagency to enable civil-military cooperation that may be better suited to accomplish post-conflict objectives.

Background

The U.S. Joint Operating Concept (JOC) for SSTR describes stability operations as central elements conducted to assist a state or region under serious stress. It suggests the primary objectives of stability operations are as follows; to help manage tension, provide security, establish economic and political systems, provide essential services, humanitarian assistance, rebuild socio-economic and physical infrastructure, and create the foundation for long-term development.⁴ President Bush described stability operations in Iraq stating, “The work ahead includes building a stronger Army, creating a stable currency, guaranteeing property rights, establishing an impartial judicial system, improving local police forces, and making infrastructure improvements.”⁵ This paper examines all of the above aspects of SSTR and recognizes security as a basic pre-condition required to enable stability.

The U.S. Department of State (DoS) indicates the United States has been involved in 17 major stability operations in the past 15 years and the military contributed the largest portion of those efforts.⁶ The DoS suggests planning for those operations has been largely ad hoc.⁷ Between 1948 and 1988 the number of peacekeeping and enforcement operations worldwide averaged five per year. Since 1988 that number has increased to as many as 20 annually.⁸

The United States answer to meet these increasing stability requirements is captured in

National Security Presidential Directive 44 (NSPD-44), *Management of Interagency Efforts Concerning Reconstruction and Stabilization*. This policy promotes the coordination of reconstruction and stabilization efforts across the government. However, it makes the DoS the lead agency for planning and coordination assigning responsibility to the State Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS). S/CRS is responsible to improve planning and implementation of SSTR assistance whenever needed.⁹ The directive instructs the interagency to anticipate and avoid state failures whenever possible by responding quickly and effectively. Further guidance is presented in DoD Directive 3000.05, *Military Support for SSTR Operations*. This directive defines SSTR as a core military mission giving it equal priority as combat operations.¹⁰

These policies are driven by shifting post-conflict challenges that require adaptive planning processes agile enough to employ all the instruments of national power at decisive points when required.¹¹ Despite difficulties in achieving interagency collaboration, some capabilities have emerged as a result of these policies to enhance SSTR operations.

Current Capabilities

Joint Publication 3.08, *Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations*, explains that cohesion across the interagency is more complex than establishing cohesion across joint forces during military operations, and when other instruments of national power are applied, complexity increases.¹² In response to national policy, various actions have improved planning capability and interagency cohesion. However, most of the realized improvements are advisory, temporary in nature, or remain at the tactical level. Unique coordination functions have been created to improve collaboration throughout the interagency. The Joint Civil-Military Operational Task Force (JCMOTF), the Civil Military Operations Centers

(CMOC) and the Geographic Combatant Commanders (GCCs) Joint Interagency Coordination Groups (JIACGs) are designed to improve coordination between the military, government agencies, intergovernmental (IGO), and nongovernmental (NGO) organizations.

The DoS has also established country teams within each embassy to improve coordination. The Ambassador as the Chief of Mission is solely responsible to integrate and synchronize all agencies serving as the senior representative to the President in their nation.¹³

Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) formed in both Iraq and Afghanistan are intended to help develop security and stability supporting our national objectives from the bottom-up. However, their organization focus and capabilities are not standardized and remain varied.¹⁴ Most recently the Joint-Interagency Intergovernmental-Multinational (JIIM) force in Iraq has realized some success in establishing integrated interagency cooperation.¹⁵

Despite these improvements in planning interagency/military capability directly aimed at supporting civil-military cooperation and SSTR requirements, there seems to be no permanent standing interagency structure at the operational level to synchronize efforts and perform operational analysis integrating lessons learned into future operations. A unit with authority beyond the limited advising capability of the JIACG could fill this gap. The JCMOTF and the CMOC are temporary and more tactical in nature designed to support achievement of a specific objective. They normally stand-up after operations have been initiated making deliberate integrated planning difficult. This results in significant gaps in capability until they can be fully organized by which point they are largely reactionary.

With only seven representatives on average and all from different agencies, the JIACG serves as an advisory group to the GCC.¹⁶ Within the JIACG, planning capability exists but is limited lacking authority and capability to influence long-term planning for sustained

security and stability operations. Finally, organizations are not standardized across the interagency further complicating planning. For example, the DoS is organized by countries and the DoD is organized by regions which are not aligned. This may cause gaps in deliberate planning focus across the interagency and at the operational level, which may be evident in achieving objectives.

Iraq: Evidence for the Need to Improve Interagency Collaborative Planning

Operation IRAQI FREEDOM represents the most recent and contentious post-conflict environment we face and much has been written about the failures of stability operations in Iraq since 2003. Conclusions point to a lack of adaptive military and interagency coordinated planning at the strategic level of government as contributing causes for failure. However, further analysis outlined below demonstrates that a gap in interagency planning capability exists at the operational level contributing to the failures in stability operations.

In concert with a Capstone Interagency Project, the U.S. Army Strategic Studies Group concluded in a recent book titled, *The Interagency and Counterinsurgency Warfare:*

Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction Roles, that

“Extremely complex and asymmetric environments in counterinsurgency warfare in the current campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan require a more cooperative and efficient interagency system to synchronize all elements of U.S. power and ensure success.”¹⁷

This conclusion is further supported by reports issued in 2002 by the DoS task force called the ‘Future of Iraq Project’, composed of economists, regional experts, security specialists, and political consultants. However, despite their collaboration and expertise, the Department of Defense (DoD) discounted their recommendations and instead created a military planning group called the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA) designed to focus on establishing democracy.¹⁸ The gap in consensus and interagency planning at the

operational level in Iraq may be evident when Ambassador Jerry Bremer unilaterally decided to dissolve the Iraqi Army putting thousands of soldiers on the streets without a way to feed their families. A hollow force remained to provide security and conduct stability operations. This political action counteracted weeks of military planning conducted by CENTCOM and other agencies.¹⁹ Collective wisdom today suggests the rise in the insurgency was fueled by this action. Both the Secretary of State and Defense were unaware of the plan to dissolve the Army, as was the senior American military commander on the ground.²⁰ Fallout from that decision and the lack of integrated, interagency planning resonates today.

The special inspector general for Iraq Reconstruction, Stewart Bowen stated that the DoD had no plan to reconstruct the government in Iraq after the invasion, or to restore infrastructure.²¹ Mr. Bowen highlighted a poor working relationship between the Iraq embassy and the military, and attributed part of the reconstruction failures in Iraq to the State Department's inability to provide civilian expertise capacity.²² Additionally, as a result of faulty assumptions that led to inadequate planning, security was never sufficiently achieved. The RAND corporation concludes in their 2008 study of Iraq that DoD planners made little use of existing operations plans. They also suggest the assumption that interagency and intergovernmental support for reconstruction efforts would be provided was also false.²³ Finally, RAND concluded that the United States went into Iraq on a "best-case" assumption with inadequate military numbers. Unanticipated challenges were repeatedly encountered, civil capacity arrived late to the fight, and mixed competence played a large part in the failures.²⁴ The means available to build civil capacity did not match the requirements due to false assumptions in planning and policy shifts.

The RAND study's analysis of Iraq supports this paper's assertion that the DoD should focus on building standing SSTR planning capabilities and should originate at higher levels extending throughout the government. It advocated a careful balance between civilian agencies to include the DoD, DoS, Treasury Department, United States Assistance and International Development (USAID), Department of Justice, various NGOs, and IGOs, and the international community to successfully complete SSTR actions. The United States should synchronize various agency efforts and resources in the future in order to win the peace in Iraq and other future SSTR operations.²⁵

SOCOM as a Model to Meet Functional Challenges

A similar functional organization has already proven successful balancing similar functional challenges. SOCOM and its subordinate Theater Special Operation Commands (TSOCs) is a unique structure that has demonstrated capability to plan and focus resources. SOCOM as a functional command provides a structural model to follow in order to execute operations of elevated importance.

TSOCs are sub-unified commands designed to plan and execute the GCCs special operations missions including limited civil affairs activities when required. However, although TSOCs are responsible to the GCC, they also align priorities through the functional authority of SOCOM. With increased authority through flag officer leadership, sub-unified commands are standing organizations within unified commands authorized to conduct operations on a continuing basis and may be established on a geographic or functional basis.²⁶ Within the TSOC, special operations are assigned a single commander to improve unity of action through centralized direction. The TSOCs clear unity of command improves likelihood that planning is deliberate. TSOCs improve regional interface and provide a core

around which Joint Task Forces can be organized. Through the sub-unified TSOC, the GCC has flexibility and exercises Operational Control (OPCON) of all assigned special operations forces.²⁷ They have experienced staffs with planning capability to help functional personnel fully integrate into theater operations, and component commanders understand their capabilities and requirements. SOCOM as the functional combatant command provides funding and forces to the sub-unified commands increasing flexibility of resources and capabilities.²⁸ A functional interagency structure for SSTR may create the same flexibility and leverage realized by SOCOM, but would expand it by integrating the interagency.

Relevance to the Combatant Commander

Operational concepts currently being developed by the S/CRS propose a series of teams from the tactical to strategic levels to plan and execute stability operations. The Advanced Civilian Team (ACTs) would operate at the operational and tactical level.²⁹ ACTs are still in development stage, however it is conceivable they will fall short of a robust and permanent standing planning capability. They will more likely be tied directly to specific objectives for specific stability operations such as in Iraq or Afghanistan.

The DoD would be part of the teams at every level to include the strategic Integration Planning Cell (IPC). However, it has already been suggested that the IPC should have the means to affect changes to Combatant Command plans.³⁰ For this reason, the Combatant Commander should be supported by robust and integrated interagency leadership and planning capability to improve unified action, and better integrate S/CRS efforts without allowing the IPC to jeopardize security operations.

Component Service Support: Improving Military Civil Affairs Capability

A new functional structure for SSTR could hold service components accountable through

continuous analysis to produce improved SSTR capability. Currently, it seems little accountability exists to ensure all services give SSTR the increased priority required by policy. A sub-unified command under the GCC could provide the means to synchronize service component support.

Ninety percent of civil affairs (CA) capability currently resides in the Army reserve and should be built into the active duty force to better support exercises, training, and deployment requirements as part of comprehensive interagency teams.³¹ Sub-unified commands may help achieve a broader understanding of CA and foreign area officer (FAO) capabilities across the service components and within the regional combatant commands to aid in planning across the full spectrum of stability operations. Leverage applied by the unified SSTR functional command could produce robust training programs, career development paths, and promotion opportunity for both military and civilian members. Because of the increase in SSTR requirements world-wide, the United States should maximize service component capabilities to meet SSTR objectives.

Critical Analysis

The JOC for SSTR suggests that a critical capability in achieving SSTR objectives is ensuring seamless knowledge sharing is accomplished prior to, during, and after SSTR operations across the interagency and to multi-national partners.³² Army Colonel Gregory Cantwell, a strategic plans and policy officer and Ph.D., suggests that a functional commander for SSTR is required to fully assess what capabilities are available and required.³³ However, common indicators to determine how successful specific capabilities are in meeting objectives should be aligned with strategic guidance. Aiding the indigenous country in tracking actionable intelligence, economic output, improvements in quality of life,

the number of schools created or attacked, the level of crime, the status of civil-engineering projects, etc., could all fall within the responsibilities outlined in the sub-unified command structure for SSTR. Their detailed analysis could help decision makers properly allocate resources and synchronize efforts.

A recent study by the RAND Corporation analyzed sixteen different stability operations producing common indicators. Although the environments changed and unique influences affected capacity-building capability; objectives and instruments and techniques remained largely the same. Manpower, money, and time made up the primary constant variables for analysis and measurement.³⁴ Other constant measures used to define success included military presence, international police, duration of the mission, timing of elections, and economic assistance. Output measures included casualties, growth per capita, qualitative measures of sustained peace, and sustainment of democratic principles.³⁵ Measures of Effectiveness (MOEs) such as these are labor intensive to track and integrate into planning processes, let alone effect change. However, close scrutiny by a focused sub-unified command for SSTR could help exploit critical vulnerabilities to achieve objectives. Operationalizing stability MOEs and sharing lessons learned could aid decision makers in averting shortfalls in mission analysis and select proper courses of action. Informed and predictive planning decisions could result.

Leveraging Resources

By standing up a new functional structure to combine military and civilian planning capabilities, cost could be deferred by reducing duplication of effort. Differing organizational agendas and compartmented planning often creates parallel operations hindering accomplishment of SSTR objectives.³⁶ Consider the following costs; U.S. Africa Command

(AFRICOM) is projected to spend \$5 billion to stand up their new headquarters,³⁷ the DoS and USAID budgets allocate approximately \$25 billion dollars for foreign operations annually, and the DoD's annual budget is approximately \$700 billion of which only \$100 million was directed to S/CRS for stability operations. However, the DoS has little capacity to ensure the money is allocated in the best interest of the United States with only 6,000 foreign service officers.³⁸ Enhanced planning through the proposed functional interagency structure could increase accountability of resources and aid GCCs in placing critical SSTR capabilities at decisive points.

DoS vs DoD as Lead Agent for SSTR Planning

The State Department has the preponderance of knowledge when it comes to country development issues. However, during the three years since its inception, S/CRS has not been able to acquire the funding or manpower to fulfill its responsibilities as evidenced in part by the Secretary of State and USAID requests for the DoD to fill 40 percent of 300 critical positions supporting stability operations in Iraq.³⁹ Ambassador Carlos Pascual, initial head of S/CRS suggested that a robust capability is still required to fulfill S/CRS mandates for SSTR.⁴⁰ Indeed, knowledge and expertise without capabilities and resources to plan and execute stability operations makes DoS leadership of SSTR untenable at least in the short term. Down the road the DoS may be both capable and more closely aligned to the mission making them better suited to lead SSTR efforts.⁴¹ Until then, the proposed structure could improve SSTR planning efforts making them mutually supporting and better integrated with S/CRS planning efforts. The proposed structure could build on the DoD Joint Operating Concept (JOC) for SSTR while better integrating the DoS's SSTR Essential Task Matrix (ETM). Until the DoS can plan and effectively integrate military and interagency capabilities

for execution of SSTR operations, the DoD having the preponderance of capability and resources, should lead planning and execution of SSTR through the proposed structure.

Benefits to the Combatant Commander

By creating a supporting functional interagency structure, integrated military and interagency planning for stability operations could be increased across the spectrum of operations focusing all the instruments of national power in control of the sub-unified commander. This could allow the GCC to focus on other competing objectives. GCCs could have increased capability to plan and execute concurrent stability operations in multiple areas as seen in Iraq and Afghanistan. Increased flexibility and leverage for SSTR resources could help the combatant command overcome planning challenges that previously rendered stability operations untenable. With a sub-unified command in each region for SSTR, requirements could be elevated from the GCC to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for validation and tasked through the unified functional command for allocation of funding and forces to the sub-unified commands for execution of operations. As required by DoD directive 3000.05, balance between stability and combat operations could be better achieved.

Counterargument and Rebuttal

Opponents of this paper could argue that the regional combatant commander is better suited to handle all operations within their region and a new functional command for SSTR would degrade unity of effort. Differences in planning priorities, understanding for regional influences, and lack of coordination between the joint interagency functional command and the GCC could cause friction and jeopardize a smooth transition to stability operations.

This argument is valid. However, a functional interagency command for SSTR could enhance the GCCs authority and control. The Unified Command Plan limits a unified

functional commander's authority to only synchronizing, planning, and allocating forces unless specifically directed by the President or Secretary of Defense. The authority to execute operations remains with the GCC to best maintain unified action.⁴² That said, unified action is described in U.S. Joint Publication 5-0 as "... including synchronization and/or integration of joint and multinational military operations with the activities of local, state, and federal government agencies and intergovernmental (IGO) and nongovernmental (NGO) organizations."⁴³ Under the proposed structure the GCCs could retain OPCON, but the functional interagency command could provide increased planning and resources improving GCC capabilities. The sub-unified commands under the GCC could provide focused leadership to improve unity of command and achieve unified action.

A Recommended Solution to Achieve Integrated Planning Through Unified Action

The JOC for SSTR suggests critical capabilities for stability operations include being able to systematically plan, allocate resources, and execute operations within an integrated framework. It also suggests unified action for SSTR must be achieved across the interagency and with multi-national NGO partners.⁴⁴ However, a team commissioned to revisit the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act for Government and Defense Reform, concluded that long-term planning is rarely conducted outside the DoD because they maintain the preponderance of trained planners and capabilities to perform SSTR. Supporting this paper's proposal, they also suggest GCCs should incorporate the interagency into campaign planning by creating standing core elements for SSTR led by an appointed officer to improve unity of effort.⁴⁵

However, a standing core element remains advisory in nature and falls short of achieving robust military and interagency planning capability and unity of command with authority to better achieve unified action. New sub-unified functional commands for Humanitarian

Assistance and Security and Stability (henceforth referred to as HASSOCs) under the GCCs may be required. HASSOCs could improve unified action through flag-officer leadership focused on integrating interagency and regional expertise into planning. With HASSOCs, OPCON and execution of operations under normal circumstances would be retained by the GCC improving unity of command and focused priorities and capabilities.

Additionally, to bridge the planning gap between the HASSOCs and the National Security Council, a new unified joint interagency functional command for Humanitarian Assistance and Security and Stability planning (henceforth referred to as HASSCOM) is recommended. HASSCOM could be led by a 4-star officer with a civilian interagency deputy, to better prioritize efforts between the combatant commands and DoS Regional Bureaus. They could advocate to Congress the need for fiscal, logistic and manpower resources. Additionally, they could synchronize training, accountability, and oversight of interagency planning for SSTR operations world-wide. Centralized functional control of resources could save time focusing interagency expertise on analysis and standardizing solutions to common operational problems. Integrated interagency planning may aid in crisis action, mitigate risk, and help the HASSOCs manage consequences.

Joint Publication 3-0 suggests Joint Forces Commanders (JFC) should ensure that their joint operations are integrated and synchronized with the forces and actions of other military and non-military organizations in the operational area.⁴⁶ To meet this mandate, HASSOCs and HASSCOM may improve the ability of the JFCs to rapidly form JCMOTFs or stand up CMOCs. Supported by pre-coordinated HASSOC and HASSCOM planning, JCMOTF and CMOC coordination functions could better shape the environment prior to combat operations, and maintain civilian capacity at critical times during the conflict. The HASSOC

builds upon all the capabilities of the JIACG improving collaboration and adding continuity and regional expertise. JIACG functions including crisis planning and assessment, advising the GCC on campaign planning, civil-military planning, providing vital links to Washington's civilian strategic planners, and outreach to civilian regional and international contacts could all be elevated in priority through the HASSOC.⁴⁷

SSTR Functional Structure

Stability operations require integration posing far more interagency complexities than combat operations and require the same level of deliberate planning, direction, standing expertise, and consolidation of forces and resources to be successful. However, only recently has the DoD begun to push for interagency representation on regional staffs as evidenced by AFRICOM and U.S Southern Command's recent integration of some interagency personnel into their staff structures. Introduced in this proposal, integrating the common joint staff functions including; manpower, intelligence, logistics, operations, communications, and plans and requirements with interagency planning functions to include; governance, development, socio-cultural, justice, economic, infrastructure, civil-military coordination, and humanitarian assistance may help synchronize these mutually supporting capabilities.

To achieve this, the JOC for SSTR is mirrored in mission sets by the S/CRS operating concept, outlining five major mission elements as follows; establish and maintain a safe and secure environment, deliver humanitarian assistance, reconstitute critical infrastructure and essential services, support economic development, and establish representative effective government.⁴⁸ The proposed HASSOC structure in figure one below incorporates these and serves as a baseline for GCCs to modify to meet regional needs. This functional alignment should better enable planners to aid the host country in stability and reconstruction efforts.

HASSOC Structure




Figure 1. HASSOC Baseline Structure⁴⁹

HASSOCs could serve to operationalize the civilian planning process normally guided by ad hoc planning, lining up reconstruction capabilities through improved service component integration, increased communication, and aligned objectives. By contrast, through improved communication, it will also serve to inform the military of civilian stability and reconstruction intricacies.⁵⁰ HASSOCs bring the two planning processes together under an authoritative structure with expertise to plan for the required critical capabilities.

A collaborative planning process under a single interagency functional structure that incorporates both DoD Theater Security Cooperation and DoS Mission Performance Plans for SSTR could better harmonize civilian and military capabilities and effort. Because NGO, military, and civilian SSTR capabilities are interconnected, synchronizing them through integrated planning under a unified structure is paramount.

Standing up an interagency functional command may help balance resources and planning across the interagency, leverage resources, and build expertise with unique civil support skill sets required of both military and civilian agencies. Through alignment of priorities and

planning, capability for SSTR should increase. Unified action could improve communication across the interagency producing deliberate and intended effects. Both the Secretary of Defense and Secretary of State could be better postured to leverage multi-national partners due to improved analysis of past SSTR operations and better accountability of current stability operations. Centralized authority in support of planning, accountability, and resource allocation could not only help align priorities to objectives but leverage the interagency and multinational partners to have more vested interest in SSTR operations.

Conclusion

Weak and failing states may disrupt regional stability and have adverse impacts world-wide if left to their own demise. However, stability operations designed to rescue failing states are costly in life and resources and difficult to maintain without international support. For this reason, the Secretary of Defense has placed the importance of stability operations equal to combat operations. However, the interagency has hardly begun to make progress in meeting stability objectives. Iraq serves as a prime example of how uncoordinated planning for stability operations has led to false assumptions, unacceptable risk, and improper allocation of resources jeopardizing losing the peace. Unified action at the operational level could be better achieved by creating a joint interagency functional command and sub-unified command structure for SSTR to improve planning and focus capabilities to requirements.

General George Casey, Chief of Staff of the Army, recently stated in reference to the release of the new Army Operations Manual,

“ ... the new version of the field manual captures a new operational concept where commanders employ offensive, defensive, and stability or civil support operations simultaneously. This has major ramifications for training, planning and decision-making, and represents a significant challenge to military forces.”⁵¹

The Army has created and aligned doctrine for security and stability operations with

interagency concepts and is initiating planning in accordance with the given strategic guidance. It is clear national policy and doctrine have been updated and large organizations are being set in motion to 'win the peace'. A robust structure plugged into the strategic level of government through HASSCOM and linking the tactical with the operational level through HASSOCs on a permanent basis could better steer interagency efforts in the same direction through integrated planning. Integrated interagency planning could be focused and resources better leveraged to enable operational commanders to apply their art to SSTR operations.

Notes

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- ² Jay W. Boggs and Joseph R. Cerami, eds., *The Interagency and Counterinsurgency Warfare: Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction Roles*, (U.S. Government, Strategic Studies Institute), 38.
- ³ For purposes of this paper stability operations includes transition and reconstruction, humanitarian assistance, and peacekeeping and enforcement.
- ⁴ U.S. Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Operating Concept (JOC), *Military Support to Stabilization, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations Version 2.0*, (Washington, D.C.: CJCS, December 2006). iii.
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- ⁸ James Dobbins, et al., *U.N.'s Role in Nation Building: From the Congo to Iraq*, (RAND Corporation, 2005), 214.
- ⁹ Boggs and Cerami, *The Interagency and Counterinsurgency Warfare: Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction Roles*, 11.
- ¹⁰ Ibid., 305.
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